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Abstract
Network Address Translation or NAT, is a technology that is used to translate internal addresses
to globally routable addresses on the internet. It is used extensively in almost every network
requiring global connectivity due to the current lack of IPv4 addresses. The primary mechanism
used to facilitate the translation of internal addresses to external addresses and vice versa is the
translation table. This study takes an in-depth look at how five different vendors: Cisco,
Extreme, Linksys, VMWare, and Vyatta, implement the translation table during active NAT
sessions. Additionally, this study analyzes the methodology required to fill a translation table
and the Denial of Service that is a result of the attack. We consider the relative difficulty of
accomplishing this task between the different platforms and protocols (TCP vs UDP vs ICMP).
We conclude this study with steps that can be taken to prevent or mitigate the NAT DOS attack.

1. Introduction
1.1: Background
Network Address Translation is a technology that is so widely deployed, it can be found in
almost every home and in every company that has an enterprise network. With the scarcity of
public IPv4 addresses, NAT with port translation has become a necessity when organizations
need to provide Internet access to multiple users on the inside of their network. Devices that do
the translations keep track of these connections in the NAT translation table. This table maps
inside and outside ports and IP addresses so that internal hosts can have multiple concurrent
conversations with the outside world. However, this creates a single point of failure in the
network. If the translation table becomes too full or non-functional, the internal network could
suffer connectivity issues when trying to reach the global network. This makes translation tables
a prime candidate for denial of service attacks by a malicious user.
With the large address space provided by IPv6 and its rapid adoption by ISPs and companies
around the world, many would argue that NAT is quickly becoming obsolete. Unfortunately,
this is not quite the case. The majority of businesses and households currently on the internet
(especially in the United States) currently run IPv4 networks using NAT, and getting all of these
entities to migrate to IPv6 is not a quick or easy process. Even when the migration has fully
occurred, there will still be a need for NAT for legacy devices and applications that do not
support IPv6. Additionally, there are some issues present in IPv6 with address renumbering and
multi-homing issues that may lead to NAT being adopted in the IPv6 world [8]. Consequently,
NAT (especially NAT with Port Translation) will remain a widely adopted and relevant
technology for years to come.
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Additionally, many users rely on NAT as a type of barrier between their internal network and the
internet. The inherent workings of the NAT process can mask the internal addresses of the
internal nodes, however those nodes can still be accessed from the outside (NAT was never
designed for security purposes). Another danger is that if an internal host establishes a
connection to a malicious outside host, the attacker can use the knowledge of the outside IP
address and port to push potentially dangerous packets back through the NAT device to the
internal host.
Therefore, it is important to understand how different vendors handle translation table behavior,
especially in an enterprise environment which contains devices from multiple vendors. This
paper will analyze how several different vendors handle NAT translation table size and how the
devices react once the tables have been filled to capacity. Additionally, this paper will determine
whether or not a small number of devices on the inside network can easily and effectively deny
service to other users on the network by targeting the translation table on these NAT devices.
Lastly, this paper will examine whether or not an attacker can gather enough information from
the outside of the network to push malicious packets through the translation device into the
internal network.
1.2 Importance
Network Address Translation with Port Translation is a widely deployed technology. In order to
segment networks from the internet and preserve IP addresses, businesses and households around
the world use NAT with Port Translation to map multiple internal hosts to a small number of
globally routable public IPs [3]. As far as internal users are concerned, this process is supposed
to be transparent, however were this process to be disrupted, multiple if not all users on the
internal network would be affected. The translation table which maps internal ports to external
ports for active connections serves as a single point of failure and could be targeted in order to
deny service to a large number of users.
While there are many specifications on how NAT with Port Translation should operate, many of
the implementation choices are left up to the vendors [3]. If the implementation discrepancies
between vendors are significant enough, they could result in significant impact to network
performance. Therefore, examination and standardization of behavior could lead to better
compatibility between different vendors as well as clarification on the best practices involved
when using NAT with PT.
In addition, making direct connections between internal, controlled equipment to the internet is
inherently risky [1]. Despite the fact that users separated from the outside by NAT, when they
establish connections to the outside, the details in their packets give outside users all of the
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information they need to push packets back through the NAT. An attacker could leverage this to
send back unexpected packets that could adversely affect the network.

2. Literature Review
2.1 NAT with Port Translation Operation
NAT is a networking function that is widely deployed in networks today. The IETF defines
NAT as a "method by which IP address are mapped from one realm to another, in an attempt to
provide transparent routing to hosts" [3]. Despite the fact that NAT with Port Translation
(NAPT) sees the most widespread deployment in modern networks by far, there are actually a
few other common types of NAT that could also be deployed: Static NAT and Dynamic NAT.
Static NAT involves mapping one internal host address to one external host address [3]. In this
instance, all ports are shared and only one entry has to be kept in the table since all connections
are directly mapped between the external address and the internal host. Because of the scarcity
of external IP addresses Static NAT sees very little use in current networks. Dynamic NAT is
similar in operation to Static NAT except that a number of internal hosts can be mapped to an
equal number of external host IPs on a rotating basis. Once an internal host is mapped to an
external entry, it acts like Static NAT in that the ports in use are mapped one to one between the
internal and external IPs. In this case the NAT does have to keep track of session data in order to
determine when an IP address is no longer being used and can be freed for use by other internal
hosts [3]. Much like Static NAT, Dynamic NAT is not widely deployed anymore because there
are generally many more internal hosts that need access to the internet than there are available
global addresses for use.
NAPT is the most common and widely deployed version of NAT. The main function of NAPT
is the conservation of global IP addresses by mapping a large number of private internal host
addresses to a single external host address [1]. Essentially, NAPT provides a way for an
intermediate device to map and translate internal IP addresses and ports to an external IP address
on a different port. By doing so, this not only allows administrative domains to conserve
resources by only buying one external IP address, but also allows administrators to segment the
administrative domain from the rest of the internet. This allows for an isolation of privately
controlled networks in both a security and administrative sense [1].
The basic operation of NAPT can be found in RFC 3022. When an internal host sends a packet
destined for an external host, the NAT device takes the internal device and source port and
inserts it into a translation table [5]. Then, the device translates the internal address to the
globally unique outside address and picks an arbitrary port that will stand in for that specific
connection [5]. Additionally, the destination address and port are mapped to the same entry in
the table thereby completing the mapping process.
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NAPT supports TCP and UDP sessions along with most types of ICMP messages (with the
exception of redirect) [5]. Since ICMP uses identifiers instead of ports, the NAT device must
map the identifiers to another set of identifiers along with the global address [5]. Despite the
large number of modifications to the packets during NAPT, it is designed to be transparent to the
end users.
2.2 Session Tracking with NAPT
One of the most important and complicated portions of NAPT has to deal with keeping track of
the sessions that are in use. RFC 2663 identifies TCP and UDP sessions by keeping track of the:





Source IP address
Source TCP/UDP port
Target IP address
Target TCP/UDP port

ICMP tracking is similar except that the NAPT device keeps track of the ICMP query ID instead
of TCP/UDP ports [3]. These properties create unique entries in the translation table and can be
used to create a virtually limitless number of permutations for use in translation.
One of the problems involved with session tracking is determining when the sessions begin and
when they end. If sessions aren't identified quickly enough, they won't fully establish and if they
aren't determined to be finished within a timely manner, superfluous entries can cause
unnecessary delay and processing overhead during the translation process. TCP session
initiation is fairly simple to detect by looking for a packet containing a SYN flag and no ACK
flags [3]. Unfortunately, UDP is a connectionless protocol and cannot be tracked as easily. RFC
2663 states that any non-TCP session can be identified by assuming that the first packet that does
not meet any currently existing session parameters can be considered a new session [3].
Session completion is a completely different matter altogether and is more complicated to deal
with than session initiation. A TCP session ends when both sides acknowledge the FIN packets
that they receive or when a RST packet is sent. However, this is based on the assumption that
the FIN or RST packet is delivered to the destination [3]. If the packet is lost or corrupted in
transit, and the NAT device automatically deletes the session information out of the translation
table, an ungraceful termination of the session would invariably occur. Therefore, a TCP session
should be assumed to be terminated after a minimum of 4 minutes after the detection of a FIN or
RST packet [3]. This number is based on the Time-Wait duration of twice the Maximum
Segment Lifetime [3]. Unfortunately, much like UDP session initiation, there isn't a way to
detect if a UDP session has completed by looking at the UDP datagram. Therefore the only way
to determine if a UDP session has completed is to base it on the time since the last packet for that
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session was sent or received. RFC 2663 states that a 24 hours is a viable assumption to terminate
TCP sessions and that non-TCP sessions can be terminated after a few minutes of idle time [3].
However, these assumptions may not be acceptable since every TCP and UDP application
functions in a unique matter. Therefore, the authors of the RFC state that the session timeout
parameters should be configurable by the NAPT device in use [3]. Having mismatching session
timeouts, or timeouts that are too short could adversely impact applications that are running on
the network. If two hosts are talking to each other through a NAT device and the translation
times out due to a spike in latency during the conversation, this would interrupt the overall
session the two hosts were having (leading to failures in the application).
2.3 NAPT Performance Issues
Despite the large amount of detail given to creating the entries, the RFCs provide little detail as
to how the translation table should be handled. RFC 3022 states that entries should be added as
they are established [5]. However, the maximum number of entries a translation table should
contain is not discussed. Furthermore, little discussion is given to what would occur should the
translation table not be able to support further entries. RFC 2663 states that should the need
arrive, the oldest sessions (based on timestamp) present in the table could be aged out in order to
make room for new session data [3]. This is not the default behavior however. Therefore, the
decisions regarding the maximum number of entries in the translation table along with how new
entries are added to the table after the table has been filled are left up to the vendor and can vary.
Generally, many companies rely on a few devices to translate many hosts to very few globally
routable IP addresses. Because of this, the translation table becomes a single point of failure and
an attacker could deny service to a large number of hosts if they were able to disrupt the normal
operation of the translation table. When compared to a traditional distributed denial of service
attack that requires thousands of compromised hosts, this type of attack could be extremely
efficient since a large number of entries can be created by each compromised host on the internal
network.
Because every conversation that is going from the internal network to the external network has to
be mapped and tracked, NAPT is an incredibly processor intensive task when compared to many
other services a router could provide. In addition, every packet that goes through the NAT
translation has to be rewritten, checksums need to be recalculated, along with many other
changes [1]. Consequently, the more translations that occur, the more processor time is
consumed to perform the NAT operations. This can lead to performance degradation for all
functions on the router if the NAT process consumes the available processing resources. As a
result, if an attacker could create a situation where the NAT has so much work to do that it
consumes all of the resources, they could cause failures not only for the NAT process, but also
other functions that the router is supposed to handle (access lists, routing protocols, DHCP
leases, etc.).
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2.4 NAPT Security Through Obscurity
One of the advantages of NAPT is that because multiple connections from internal hosts need to
be mapped to a smaller number of external global IPs, NAT devices will block inbound
connections to both TCP and UDP ports unless they are statically mapped [1]. This "one way"
behavior is a byproduct of how NAT works. Since the internal devices are being mapped to an
outside address, routes to the internal network(s) will not exist (especially in cases where the
internal addresses are private) which prevents direct communication between the internal and
external networks [4]. Therefore NAT acts as a firewall of sorts, since in most cases external
hosts cannot reach internal hosts unless the internal hosts initiates the communication. This
basic function of NAT can prevent many unwanted packets from getting through to the inside
network. However, NAT alone cannot act as a firewall. As Hartpence and Johnson showed in
their research, outside hosts can bypass the NAT and directly communicate with internal hosts if
they have a route to the inside [2]. This doesn't exploit the translation table, but it does bypass it.
However, bypassing the NAT translation table requires the attacker to have a route to the internal
network. This is a fairly unlikely option for an attacker trying to connect over the internet.
However, threats on the internal network may be able to get through a NAT device into a
sensitive portion of the network without getting translated. Therefore, NAT cannot be the solely
relied on to provide security. It should be used along with access lists or some type of
firewalling. Because of this insecurity, many small business and consumer NAT devices also
integrate a simple firewall into the device along with their other functions.
However, Hartpence and Johnson discuss the possibility of peer to peer networking opening
connections in the translation table that could be used to exploit internal hosts [2]. Since the
NAT device looks for data streams that match the 4 session characteristics listed above, an
attacker with sufficient knowledge of the translation entries, could theoretically craft packets to
traverse the NAT translation. The packets sent out by peer to peer software like bittorrent are an
ideal way for an attacker to gain access to the network. They contain all four pieces of
information necessary for an attacker to send packets back in past the NAT device. However the
impact of this type of exploit would depend on the end application and operating system of the
internal host.

2.5 IPv6 and the Future of NAT
IPv6 is a technology that has been in development for years and is finally seeing wide scale
deployments. It offers many improvements over IPv4, but the most significant change involves a
significantly larger address space. IPv6 offers 128 bits of address space as opposed to the
limited 32 bit space offered in IPv4. Therefore, every device should theoretically be able to
receive a globally routable address when IPv6 is fully implemented. This feature eliminates the
main reason that an entity would implement NAT on the edge of their network (IPv4 address
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scarcity). While this is true, there are still several issues that will require the implementation of
NAT for an extended period of time.
The first and most obvious reason NAT will continue to be used is backward compatibility.
During the migration to IPv6, NAPT will still be important for networks that are still
transitioning. Additionally, even after the majority of a network is IPv6, there will still be legacy
devices and applications that will need to remain IPv4 until they can be replaced with newer
products. For large corporations that use a lot of custom applications, this could turn out to be a
very lengthy process indeed. Legacy hardware is an especially big problem for ISPs who have to
find a way to get rid of NAT and implement IPv6 without interrupting to service to everyday
people. New hardware will have to be distributed to or purchased by home users (old IPv4
modems / routers, etc.) which will most certainly require a significant amount of time.
In addition to the migration issues that will require NAT to remain implemented, there are a few
problems with IPv6 that could lead to the implementation of NAT in the future RFC 5902
discusses several problems, with NAT as a possible solution.
The first main issue in IPv6 is address renumbering for small / medium sized businesses [8].
Today if an organization decides to change providers, relatively few changes need to be made to
make the transition because only the globally routable addresses are subject to change. If the
organization is very large, the odds are they have provider independent (global) addresses which
means that re-addressing does not need to occur at all [8]. However when IPv6 becomes
prevalent, small / medium sized organizations which cannot afford to register / buy a provider
independent block of addresses will be tied to their provider addresses. Therefore if this kind of
an organization wanted to switch providers, they would have to readdress their entire internal
network (which is a significant setback) [8]. Therefore, NAT could be used in this case to
prevent renumbering in small and medium sized organizations.
Another large issue in IPv6 is the idea of multihoming a network between multiple providers [8].
This allows for an organization to have redundancy in case one provider network becomes
unusable. If global addressing becomes the norm, organizations will have to inject both their
own routes as well as their provider routes into both provider networks. This effectively nullifies
provider-based route aggregation [8]. Essentially this means that the global routing table will
become significantly larger with each multihomed site that is added to the internet. NAT has
been proposed as a solution to this issue as well.

3. Experiment
3.1 Purpose
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The purpose of this thesis was to create a large number of TCP, UDP, and ICMP translations to
determine their impact on the translation table. This was done to observe the methods that
different vendors use to handle large translation table sizes and how they handle a situation
where the translation table can no longer create and store new entries.

3.2 Experimental Objectives
The experiments in this thesis were created to determine:
1) The maximum translation table size for a NAT device.
2) Whether the maximum translation table size is consistent between vendors.
3) Factors that determine the maximum translation table size.
4) Whether or not a single internal host can fill the translation table in a set period of time.
5) The consequences of filling the translation table.
6) Consequences of creating a large number of translations.
7) Ways to effectively prevent malicious users from creating large numbers of translations.
8) Different consequences of filling the translation table using TCP, UDP, or ICMP traffic.

3.3 Topology Design
These experiments consisted of a fairly simple topology involving two normal internal hosts, a
malicious host that would be executing the NAT DOS attack, a switch with one VLAN, a router
doing NAT or a virtual NAT in the case of VMWare, and an external host. Three main tests
would be executed: TCP, UDP, and ICMP attacks. Each of these three attacks would be tested
against a NAT device from each of the following vendors: Cisco, Extreme, Linksys, Vyatta, and
VMWare.
The following topology design was consistent for all of the experiments except for the VMWare
which can be seen in the second diagram.
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Windows XP SP2
User: Administrator
192.168.1.2
255.255.255.0

Internal Address:
192.168.1.1
255.255.255.0
F0/2

F0/3
Windows XP SP2
User: Administrator
192.168.1.3
255.255.255.0

F0/1

TCP Service: FTP
UDP Service: TFTP

F0/24

Cisco
2950

NAT
Device

Windows XP SP2
User: Administrator
74.74.74.2
255.255.255.0

External Address:
74.74.74.1
255.255.255.0

Attacker
Ubuntu 10.04
192.168.1.5
255.255.255.0

Figure 1: Topology for Cisco, Extreme, Vyatta, and Linksys Tests

Internal Address:
192.168.40.2
255.255.255.0

Windows XP SP2
User: Administrator
192.168.40.128
255.255.255.0

External Address:
74.74.74.1
255.255.255.0

TCP Service: FTP
UDP Service: TFTP

Cent OS 5
Attacker
192.168.140.129
255.255.255.0
Switch
Windows XP SP2
User: Administrator
Running VMWare
Workstation

Windows XP SP2
User: Administrator
74.74.74.2
255.255.255.0

Doing Virtual NAT in
VMWare

Figure 2: Topology for VMWare Tests
Note: Due to the fact that VMWare virtual NAT service was being tested in the second
topology, one of the internal VMs was used to execute the NAT DOS attack instead of another
physical host.

3.4: Default Device Timers
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Since the RFC documents regarding NAT only give recommendations on what the expiration
timers should be for TCP, UDP, and ICMP entries, the individual vendors have their own default
settings for each of these entries.
3.4.1 Cisco 2651
Default TCP Timeout: 24 hours (non-port-specific)
Default Syn Timeout (syn with no ack response): 60 seconds
Default fin/rst Timeout: 60 seconds
Default UDP Timeout: 5 minutes (non-port-specific)
Default ICMP Timeout: 60 seconds
* Non-port-specific applies to all translated ports that are not specifically specified in the Cisco
IOS (DNS and a few other services have their own special timeouts) *
3.4.2 Extreme Summit 200
Default TCP Timeout: 2 minutes
Default Syn Timeout (syn with no ack response): 60 seconds
Default fin/rst Timeout: 60 seconds
Default UDP Timeout: 2 minutes
Default ICMP Timeout: 3 seconds
3.4.3 Linksys WRT120N Wired/Wireless Router/AP
Default TCP Timeout: N/A
Default UDP Timeout: N/A
Default ICMP Timeout: N/A
*Not available in documentation and the limited firmware doesn't allow for diagnostic testing to
find out translation table settings*
Note: Timers on the Linksys device are not configurable by the user.
3.4.4 VMWare Workstation
Default TCP Timeout: N/A
Default UDP Timeout: 30 seconds
Default ICMP Timeout: N/A
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*The vmnetnat.conf configuration file for the VMWare NAT process does not have a
configurable field for TCP timeout. Additionally, there is no way to view the translation table
for diagnostic testing to find out the default timeout. *
3.4.5 Vyatta 5.0.2
Default TCP Timeout: 12 hours
Default UDP Timeout: 30 seconds
Default ICMP Timeout: 30 seconds
*Default timeouts for Vyatta were determined by looking at the entries after creation and
observing their time until expiration. *
Note: Timers on the Vyatta device are not configurable by the user.

3.5 TCP NAT Attack Methodology

TCP Attack Script
#!/bin/bash
For ((i=0; i<300; i++))
Do
Sudo nmap -sS 74.74.74.3-254 1>/dev/null 2/dev/null &
Done

The TCP attack script is a bash script that initiates 300 instances of NMAP to run. The flag -sS
means that it is going to send out TCP packets with the syn flag set to the range of IP address
from 74.74.74.3 to 74.74.74.254. Since NMAP is used to scan for ports, it will be sending out
syn packets to every port for every IP address in the range.
The topology for each test was set up as shown in the figures above with three PCs connected to
a switch behind a NAT device which then connected to an external host on the external network.
The only exception was the VMWare test where the topology consisted of two VMs on the
internal virtual network and one physical host on the external network. The external host was
hosting an FTP server and a TFTP server which had access one large movie file to transfer.
Only one NAT device from one vendor would be tested every time. Each vendor device would
run through the test 5 times to ensure the validity of the data. All tests in this portion of the
experiment utilized the default timers on all devices.
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Before the attack began, all of the hosts issued pings to each other to verify connectivity. This
also allowed for verification that the NAT translations were occurring correctly between the
inside network and the external network. After initial connectivity and translation functionality
were established, an internal host tested TCP and UDP functionality by using FTP and TFTP
between the inside and outside. After full functionality was determined, a unidirectional JPerf
test was run between an inside host and the outside host. This ensured that the NAT device
could not be brought down by a full load of traffic from a single device. After all of the testing
had finished, commands would be issued to the NAT device to clear the translation table and
reset the NAT statistics when applicable.
After the verification process, the attacker would kick off the script and a timer (on a stopwatch)
would be started. Each attack period would last for 5 minutes and then the NMAP processes
would be killed. Every minute during the attack, internal hosts would attempt to ping the
internal gateway, the external gateway, and the outside host. Additionally, every minute, the
internal hosts would attempt to establish an FTP and a TFTP session and attempt to transfer a
file. Also, every minute the relevant commands would be issued to the NAT device (when
applicable) to determine the number of translations and to verify that the correct translations
were being put into the translation table.
After the attack had completed, internal hosts would then attempt to ping each other, the internal
gateway, the external gateway, and the external host. Additionally, internal hosts would then
attempt to establish FTP and TFTP sessions with the external hosts in order to transfer the movie
file. This process would be repeated until all attempts were successful or until 15 minutes
elapsed.

3.6 TCP NAT Attack Observations
3.6.1 Cisco 2651 Results
After five minutes of the attack the maximum achievable entries in the translation table totaled
on average 58,000 concurrent entries. This was mainly because with no acknowledgements of
the SYN packets being sent out, the default timeout of these entries was 60 seconds. Therefore,
this attack was unable to fill the translation table under default timer settings. Despite being
unable to fill the translation table, the Cisco device was negatively impacted during the attack.
CPU usage spiked to nearly maximum during the attack as can be seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Cisco CPU utilization 2 minutes into the attack
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During this attack, the connectivity between the inside and outside hosts became intermittent
with a high rate of ICMP failure between the internal and external hosts. However, connectivity
between the internal hosts (excluding the gateway) remained unaffected. Additionally, FTP and
TFTP services became unavailable during the attack. Figure 4 shows that because of the short
timeout, most of the entries during the experiment were expiring, leading to the low number of
entries in the table after five minutes.

Figure 4: NAT statistics 3 minutes into the attack
After the attack stopped, the entries in the translation table continued to expire until none were
left. Once the attack was no longer occurring, internal hosts regained full connectivity to the
external host and FTP and TFTP sessions were able to occur.
3.6.2 Extreme Summit 200 Results
After 5 minutes of running the TCP attack, the average maximum number of entries achievable
totaled around 46,000. Because there were no acknowledgements of the TCP SYN packets that
were being sent out, the corresponding entries would expire in 60 seconds. Due to the fast rate
of expiration, the attack was unable to fill the translation table using TCP. Figure 5 shows an
example of the translation table size during the attack and that despite adding over 70,000
entries, only 44,000 or so could stay active due to the default timers. However, much like the
Cisco attack, the CPU utilization became extremely high leading to a large number of dropped
packets making connectivity to the outside intermittent at best. Hosts were able to make a few
packets through but 50% or more were usually dropped as can be seen in Figure 6.

Figure 5: Extreme NAT Statistics after 4 minutes
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Figure 6: Higher than normal latency for ICMP requests and large amounts of dropped
packets.
Additionally, all attempts to make an FTP connection or to transfer files using TFTP between the
inside and outside networks failed during the attack. Internal connectivity (excluding the
gateway) was unaffected during the attack. Despite the large disruption during the attack, after
the attack subsided full connectivity was reestablished. FTP and TFTP services could be utilized
within a few seconds of the attack being over and since the default timers were so short, the
entries in the table expired to nothing after another few minutes.
3.6.3 Linksys WRT120N Wired/Wireless Router/AP Results
Due to the limited features of the Linksys device, it was next to impossible to discover anything
about the default timers or how many entries could be held in the table at a time. The only
available data that could be gathered from the device was the outgoing translation log, part of
which can be seen in Figure 7. Unfortunately, even though the entries that are added into the
table can be seen, expirations are not listed in the log and the log is only a certain size so only a
limited amount of connections can be seen at a time.
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.199:443 is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.235:443 is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.165:WWW is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.164:WWW is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.178:WWW is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.156:WWW is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.119:WWW is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.98:WWW is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.181:WWW is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.28:WWW is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.230:WWW is accepted

Figure 7: Portion of the Linksys outgoing translation log
Despite the fact that minimal data could be gathered from the device from the attack, the effect
of the attack on the Linksys device is immediate and devastating. Within seconds of the attack
beginning, the external network and the Linksys device became unreachable. All attempts to
query the external network using ICMP fail along with any attempts to establish an FTP
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connection or TFTP transfer. Since the configuration for the Linksys device is done in-band, no
configuration changes could be done, nor could any activity statistics be pulled during the time
of the attack. Generally the gateway proved to be unreachable but occasionally partial
connectivity could be established to it as can be seen in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Partial but ineffectual connectivity to the gateway during the attack
Even though the gateway is almost completely unreachable during the attack, the outside device
continues to see the attacker traffic but not traffic from any other host. This raises the possibility
of a queuing or full buffer issue as the cause of the outage. However, the Jperf test results were
consuming 95Mbps of bandwidth during testing before the attack and network connectivity
remained unaffected. This makes the possibility of a queuing issue less likely. It is more likely
that the processing unit of the device was negatively affected during by the attack, thereby
causing the network outage.
Although the attack is devastating to network service during the attack, full network connectivity
is regained just as quickly after the attack ceases. Full ICMP connectivity along with functional
FTP and TFTP transfers are available within seconds of the attack subsiding. This also makes
the possibility that the network outage was caused by a congestion of the buffers less likely.
3.6.4 VMWare Workstation Results
VMWare is a platform that is widely utilized for the purpose of virtualizing machines. When
using VMWare, one physical host can have multiple virtual hosts running independent operating
systems and doing different tasks concurrently. One of the ways VMWare uses to facilitate
network connectivity to the virtual hosts is through its own VMWare NAT process. When using
this, the physical host has a globally routable address that is on the normal network and the
virtual hosts have internal IPs and use the physical host address in the traditional NAPT fashion.
Strangely, while the timer settings for UDP appear in the vmnetnat.conf file that controls the
virtual NAT settings, TCP timer settings appear to be nonexistent. In addition, due to the fact
that the NAT process is virtualized, no output or statistics commands can be issued to determine
the state of the process during the attack. When the attack begins, the VMWare NAT process
appears to be completely unaffected. For the first three minutes, ICMP requests are answered,
FTP transfers are possible and TFTP transfers are possible as can be seen in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: FTP and TFTP Attempts Successful 3 minutes into the attack
However, after about 4 minutes the NAT translation process appears to fail. ICMP, FTP, and
TFTP attempts from the inside to the outside fail. In addition, after this point in time, the outside
host fails to see any packets from the virtualized machines (even the attacker). On the other
hand, inside hosts are still able to communicate with each other, including the virtual gateway.
After the attack ends, ICMP connectivity is restored after about 2 minutes.
The TCP attack on the VMWare process results in strange circumstances after the attack abates.
Even though ICMP connectivity is regained between the inside and the outside, the inside hosts
are unable to use FTP or TFTP (or any other TCP or UDP service) between the inside and
outside as can be seen in figures 10 and 11. This outage lasts for a significant amount of time.
Connectivity using FTP and TFTP did not reestablish even after 15 minutes of inactivity after the
attack.

Figure 10: Internal host unable to establish FTP connection after the attack
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Figure 11: Internal host unable to establish TFTP transfer after the attack
The only way to regain TCP / UDP connectivity between the inside and outside after this attack
was executed was to restart the VMWare NAT service which can be seen in Figure 12. Only
after the service was reset, could full connectivity (ICMP, FTP, and TFTP) be achieved.

Figure 12: VMware NAT Service
3.6.5 Vyatta 5.0.2 Results
Vyatta is a network OS that can be used on a multi-NIC PC to perform routing and other IP
service functions. It has a Linux base and there are free versions and enterprise versions that
require a paid license. The command structure is very similar to that of Juniper devices, and
despite the fact that the open source version of the software used in these tests is free, it still
provides a high level of functionality.
Unfortunately despite the high level of functionality available with Vyatta, there doesn't appear
to be a way to change or view the default configuration of the TCP or UDP timers. Therefore,
all tests done to the Vyatta device were done using default timers. The Vyatta device seemed
completely unaffected by the TCP translations during and after the attack. TCP entries appeared
to last a very long time (upwards of 12 hours) and because of this several hundred thousand
entries were assumed to be translated. Unfortunately none of the show commands regarding
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NAT would work after the 5 minute period. This can be attributed to the extremely large number
of translations present on the device.
This number can be deceptive however. The Vyatta show commands do not show how many
entries are active in the table currently, only how many have matched the rule to be translated.
But since TCP entries seem to last for a very long time, it can be assumed that in this case there
are in fact hundreds of thousands of entries in the table. The lack of effect from the attack can
most likely be attributed to the relative power of the machine. This device was originally a
desktop computer and therefore, has a large amount of memory and processing power when
compared to the other devices in this test. The only negative effect the attack appeared to have
had was that the show nat translations command would lock up due to the large number of
entries in the table.
Note: Show commands for the NAT translations did not produce any output for this test
Machine Comparison
Platform
Cisco 2651
Extreme Summit 200
Linksys WRT120N
VMWare NAT
Vyatta

RAM
64MB
128MB
32MB
N/A (Process)
512MB

CPU Speed
Unavailable
Unavailable
400MHz
N/A (Process)
1.6GHz

Figure 13: Machine Specification Comparison

3.7 UDP NAT Attack Methodology
#!/bin/bash
For ((i=0; i<300; i++))
Do
Sudo nmap -sU 74.74.74.3-254 1>/dev/null 2/dev/null &
Done

The UDP attack script is a bash script that initiates 300 instances of NMAP to run. The flag -sU
means that it is going to send out UDP packets to the range of IP address from 74.74.74.3 to
74.74.74.254. Since NMAP is used to scan for ports, it will be sending out UDP packets to
every port for every IP address in the range.
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The topology for each test was set up as shown in the figures above with three PCs connected to
a switch behind a NAT device which then connected to an external host on the external network.
The only exception was the VMWare test where the topology consisted of two VMs on the
internal virtual network and one physical host on the external network. The external host was
hosting an FTP server and a TFTP server which had access one large movie file to transfer.
Only one NAT device from one vendor would be tested every time. Each vendor device would
run through the test 5 times to ensure the validity of the data. All tests in this portion of the
experiment utilized the default timers on all devices.
Before the attack began, all of the hosts issued pings to each other to verify connectivity. This
also allowed for verification that the NAT translations were occurring correctly between the
inside network and the external network. After initial connectivity and translation functionality
were established, an internal host tested TCP and UDP functionality by using FTP and TFTP
between the inside and outside. After full functionality was determined, a unidirectional JPerf
test was run between an inside host and the outside host. This ensured that the NAT device
could not be brought down by a full load of traffic from a single device. After all of the testing
had finished, commands would be issued to the NAT device to clear the translation table and
reset the NAT statistics when applicable.
After the verification process, the attacker would kick off the script and a timer (on a stopwatch)
would be started. Each attack period would last for 5 minutes and then the NMAP processes
would be killed. Every minute during the attack, internal hosts would attempt to ping the
internal gateway, the external gateway, and the outside host. Additionally, every minute, the
internal hosts would attempt to establish an FTP and a TFTP session and attempt to transfer a
file. Also, every minute the relevant commands would be issued to the NAT device (when
applicable) to determine the number of translations and to verify that the correct translations
were being put into the translation table.
After the attack had completed, internal hosts would then attempt to ping each other, the internal
gateway, the external gateway, and the external host. Additionally, internal hosts would then
attempt to establish FTP and TFTP sessions with the external hosts in order to transfer the movie
file. This process would be repeated until all attempts were successful or until 15 minutes
elapsed.
3.8 UDP Attack Observations
3.8.1 Cisco 2651 Results
The first few times I ran the test script, the entries ended up showing up in the NAT translation
table as ICMP entries, and therefore would expire after 60 seconds. In order to get around this
issue, I ran the following script instead.
#!/bin/bash
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For ((i=0; i<300; i++))
Do
Sudo nmap -sU 74.74.74.2 1>/dev/null 2/dev/null &
Done

During my experiments I found that the Cisco platform would not register UDP packets as UDP
unless they went to a host that existed on the outside network. This script is identical to the
script run on all of the other platforms except that it had one host as a target to scan on the
outside as opposed to a range. The rate of translations entered remained similar to the other tests
and the translation table filled with the expected entries while using this script.
After a little more than three minutes (3:20 on average) after the UDP attack was started, the
table on the 2651 became full and unable to accept more entries. The maximum number of
entries in the table for this device ended up being around 117,668. This resulted in massive
amounts of memory errors as can be seen in Figure 14. Also, other functionality of the router
was affected while the memory was full of translation entries. The auto-complete and question
mark functions no longer worked and the router process for routing protocols could not be
invoked either as can be seen in Figure 15.

Figure 14: Memory Traceback errors due to full translation table

Figure 15: Normal services on the router could not be invoked
During the attack, the CPU utilization spiked to between 80 and 100% and internal hosts were
unable to reach the outside or the gateway as can be seen in Figure 16. However, internal
network connectivity (aside from the gateway) remained unaffected. Because of the loss of
connectivity, FTP and TFTP transfers failed during the attack.
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Figure 16: High CPU usage during the attack
After the active part of the attack stopped, the table remained full for a short period (until the
active entries started to expire) and during this time FTP and TFTP services remained
unavailable. After the entries started to expire, new entries could be added to the table and full
connectivity was regained.
3.8.2 Extreme Summit 200 Results
After 5 minutes of running the UDP attack against the Extreme device only about 44,000 active
entries were able to be maintained. This is due to the aggressive two minute UDP default timer
that the Extreme device had in place. Despite the timers however, the table did get fairly sizable
as can be seen in Figure 17.

Figure 17: Extreme translation table (partial) after 5 minutes
Much like the Cisco test and the TCP tests before it, CPU utilization spiked during the attack.
Also during the attack, inside hosts lost connectivity to the outside host. TCP and TFTP
transfers could not be established during the attack either. After the attack completed, full
connectivity was restored. At this point neither TCP or UDP attacks were able to fill the
translation table on the Extreme, however the CPU utilization during the attack occurs in both.
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3.8.3 Linksys WRT120N Wired/Wireless Router/AP Results
Much like during the TCP attack, the UDP attack has immediate and catastrophic results when
the Linksys device is targeted. All connectivity between the internal hosts and the external host
is lost as soon as the attack begins. Additionally, FTP and TFTP transfers do not work for the
duration of the attack. Unfortunately, the firmware doesn't provide very much information as to
the NAT process on the router. There aren't any commands to show active entries or to keep
count of the total translations. The only results that could be gleaned came from the translation
logs which are of a limited size. Therefore, total entries cannot be determined from the number
of entries in the table. A portion of the UDP log can be found in Figure 18.
192.168.1.5 to 129.21.3.17:DOMAIN is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.2:34892 is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 64.132.49.139:WWW is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.2:49207 is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 129.21.4.18:DOMAIN is accepted
192.168.1.3 to 10.200.200.17:402 is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.2:539 is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 129.21.3.17:DOMAIN is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 129.21.4.18:DOMAIN is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.2:37843 is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 129.21.4.18:DOMAIN is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 129.21.3.17:DOMAIN is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.2:1457 is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 129.21.3.17:DOMAIN is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.2:21358 is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 129.21.4.18:DOMAIN is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 129.21.3.17:DOMAIN is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.2:54114 is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 129.21.4.18:DOMAIN is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.2:25931 is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.2:20525 is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 74.74.74.2:443 is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 129.21.4.18:DOMAIN is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 129.21.3.17:DOMAIN is accepted
192.168.1.5 to 129.21.4.18:DOMAIN is accepted

Figure 18: Portion of the UDP log from the Linksys device
The problem of retrieving information on this platform is exacerbated by the fact that all
management is done in-band and cannot be accessed during the execution of the attack.
After the attack has completed, full connectivity is restored after about 10 seconds. Full Jperf
tests were done before the attack phase like during the TCP segment. Connectivity was not
affected during the TCP or UDP jperf tests and no buffer problems were encountered. These
preliminary results make overutilization and buffer issues due to the UDP NAT attack unlikely.
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3.8.4 VMWare Workstation Results
Unlike the TCP attack which had devastating effects on the VMWare NAT process, the UDP
attack had little noticeable effect. The latency increased slightly during the attack but all of the
devices retained connectivity to the outside and the FTP and TFTP transfers were successful
every time they were attempted. This can largely be attributed to the default 30 second UDP
timer specified in the vmnetnat.conf file as can be seen in Figure 19.
[udp]
# Timeout in seconds, 0 = no timeout, default = 30; real value might
# be up to 100% longer
timeout = 30

Figure 19: Configurable UDP portion of the vmnetnat.conf file.
Because the UDP timer was set to 30 seconds (unlike TCP which didn't have a timer setting) we
can conclude that the entries that the false entries that were being added were expiring every
thirty seconds. This prevented the VMWare NAT process from being overloaded with
translations and hanging up. The VMWare NAT process faired significantly better in this test
than the previous TCP test. Therefore, we can conclude that having the ability to configure the
TCP timer could have helped minimize the effects of this attack.
3.8.5 Vyatta 5.0.2
Like the TCP settings, Vyatta doesn't appear to have any way to configure the UDP settings, but
UDP entries appear to expire after 30 seconds by default. During the attack, there was no loss of
connectivity and FTP and TFTP transfers did not fail during the test period. After 5 minutes
around 268,000 entries appeared to match the NAT rule as can be seen in Figure 20.
Unfortunately there is no way to tell how many of those entries were active at the end of the
testing period. Since the expiration timer is so low the number of active entries in the table was
most likely a significantly smaller number. The lack of effectiveness of this attack on this
platform can largely be attributed to the relatively powerful hardware that this platform was
hosted on, but also to the short UDP expirations that are the default on this platform. The only
difference in results between the TCP and UDP attacks was that the NAT commands would not
work during the TCP attack.

Figure 20: Entries that matched the NAT rule after 5 minutes
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3.9 ICMP NAT Attack Methodology

#!/bin/bash
For ((i=0; i<300; i++))
Do
Sudo nmap -sP 74.74.74.3-254 1>/dev/null 2/dev/null &
Done

The ICMP attack script is a bash script that initiates 300 instances of NMAP to run. The flag -sP
means that it is going to send out ICMP echo requests to the range of IP address from 74.74.74.3
to 74.74.74.254. Unlike the TCP and UDP tests, the ICMP tests only sends echo requests instead
of scanning for ports.
The topology for each test was set up as shown in the figures above with three PCs connected to
a switch behind a NAT device which then connected to an external host on the external network.
The only exception was the VMWare test where the topology consisted of two VMs on the
internal virtual network and one physical host on the external network. The external host was
hosting an FTP server and a TFTP server which had access one large movie file to transfer.
Only one NAT device from one vendor would be tested every time. Each vendor device would
run through the test 5 times to ensure the validity of the data. All tests in this portion of the
experiment utilized the default timers on all devices.
Before the attack began, all of the hosts issued pings to each other to verify connectivity. This
also allowed for verification that the NAT translations were occurring correctly between the
inside network and the external network. After initial connectivity and translation functionality
were established, an internal host tested TCP and UDP functionality by using FTP and TFTP
between the inside and outside. After full functionality was determined, a unidirectional JPerf
test was run between an inside host and the outside host. This ensured that the NAT device
could not be brought down by a full load of traffic from a single device. After all of the testing
had finished, commands would be issued to the NAT device to clear the translation table and
reset the NAT statistics when applicable.
After the verification process, the attacker would kick off the script and a timer (on a stopwatch)
would be started. Each attack period would last for 5 minutes and then the NMAP processes
would be killed. Every minute during the attack, internal hosts would attempt to ping the
internal gateway, the external gateway, and the outside host. Additionally, every minute, the
internal hosts would attempt to establish an FTP and a TFTP session and attempt to transfer a
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file. Also, every minute the relevant commands would be issued to the NAT device (when
applicable) to determine the number of translations and to verify that the correct translations
were being put into the translation table.
After the attack had completed, internal hosts would then attempt to ping each other, the internal
gateway, the external gateway, and the external host. Additionally, internal hosts would then
attempt to establish FTP and TFTP sessions with the external hosts in order to transfer the movie
file. This process would be repeated until all attempts were successful or until 15 minutes
elapsed.
3.9 ICMP Attack Observations
3.9.1 Cisco 2651 Results
Similar to the TCP SYN settings, ICMP translations expire in 30 seconds by default. After 5
minutes the number of active translations averaged around 45,000 entries. However, this attack
did not seem to affect the router as badly as the TCP or UDP attacks. Figure 21 shows that while
the CPU utilization is high (and does occasionally spike very high) during the attack, it is not
nearly as high on average as the previous two attacks.

Figure 21: CPU usage on the 2651 5 minutes into the ICMP attack.
As previously discussed, unlike TCP or UDP, there are no ports to translate. Therefore, the NAT
device uses the ICMP identifiers to map internal requests to the external address. This can be
seen in action in Figure 22.

Figure 22: ICMP Translations on the Cisco 2651
Unlike the TCP and UDP attacks, there was very little negative impact on the device during this
attack. None of the devices lost connectivity and FTP and TFTP services remained unaffected
during this attack. Additionally, latency increases were minimal as can be seen in Figure 23.

Winemiller 28

Figure 23: Latency test 3 minutes into the attack
Despite the fact that ICMP does have a checksum that needs to be recalculated and rewritten just
like TCP and UDP, this attack didn't appear to have any substantial negative effects on the Cisco
device. However, CPU utilization did go up enough that problems could have occurred had the
router had more load on it from other processes.
3.9.2 Extreme Summit 200 Results
By default, the NAPT configuration on the Extreme did not translate ICMP to the outside
address like the other platforms. Therefore another rule had to be added to match all ICMP
traffic and translate it to the external IP address. This portion of the configuration can be seen in
Figure 24. The first line caused both TCP and UDP to be translated and the second line creates a
dynamic mapping between the internal hosts and the outside address for ICMP packets.
configure nat add "n_outside" map source any to 74.74.74.1/32 both portmap
configure nat add "n_outside" map source any to 74.74.74.1/32

Figure 24: Second dynamic entry added to the process in order to translate ICMP requests
Even though there was a second rule added and the NAT device still had to keep track of /
rewrite the ICMP packets, there appeared to be little to no impact on the device during the ICMP
attack. After 5 minutes there were less than 10,000 translations active in the table. This was due
to the extremely low 3 second ICMP timeout that was the default on the device. Additionally,
CPU utilization appeared to be relatively low when compared to the TCP and UDP attack,
hovering around 40%. There was no loss of connectivity during the attack, FTP and TFTP
services remained available during and after the attack, and there didn't appear to be any negative
effects on the device during the ICMP attack.
Although the 3 second timer was effective in limiting the number of ICMP entries in the table,
the low amount of time makes it more likely that translations will expire before the device can
receive a response. This could make troubleshooting in high latency / low available bandwidth
situations difficult since the translations can expire before ICMP packets can complete the round
trip journey.
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Since none of the three attacks were able to fill the translation table with the default timers,
another set of experiments was designed and executed with unlimited timers in order to
determine the effect of a full translation table on the Extreme device. The methodology and
results of these experiments will be discussed in a later section.
3.9.3 Linksys WRT120N Wired/Wireless Router/AP Results
The results of the ICMP test on the Linksys platform exactly mirror the results of the TCP and
UDP tests. Once the attack begins, connectivity between the inside and outside is disrupted and
remains disrupted for the duration of the attack. Figure 25 shows connectivity beginning to fail
at the start of the attack and completely failing shortly thereafter.

Figure 25: ICMP requests begin failing almost immediately during the ICMP attack
Unlike the TCP and UDP translations, the Linksys logs do not appear to keep track of ICMP
translations. This makes tracking the connections through the Linksys device even more difficult
than usual since all management is done in-band and cannot be used during the attack. However,
unlike the other platforms, the ICMP attack has a catastrophic effect when executed on the
Linksys platform.
3.9.4 VMWare Workstation Results
Unlike UDP, there is no configurable ICMP setting present in the vmnetnat.conf file. This
paired with the inability to execute debugging commands on the NAT service make it almost
impossible to determine the default timer for the ICMP process. Although there was no setting
present, the VMWare NAT process translated ICMP packets by default and did not require
additional configuration like the Extreme device did.
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Much like the other platforms (excluding the Linksys), there was no noticeable impact on
network connectivity during the attack. Internal devices could contact the external device during
the attack and both FTP and TFTP transfers occurred successfully during the attack.
3.9.5 Vyatta 5.0.2 Results
As with all the other Vyatta tests, there are no configurable parameters for the ICMP timeout.
Additionally, the defaults are not listed in the documentation, however when a show nat
translations monitor detail is shown, we can see the entries being added in real time. This shows
that the ICMP default timeout is 30 seconds.

Figure 26: ICMP Entries being aged out and added in
Unfortunately the show nat statistics command only shows how many entries have matched the
rule and not how many translations are currently active. However, after 5 minutes, a whopping
560,000 entries were translated. But due to the lack of output, determining how many were
active was impossible. Due to the relatively fast expiration of these entries, it is likely that the
number of active entries at one time was relatively minimal.

Figure 27: Number of entries matching the rule after 5 minutes
During the attack, there was no loss of connectivity between the inside hosts and the outside.
Both FTP and TFTP transfers were successful during and after the attack. There didn't appear to
be any adverse consequences to normal service throughout the entirety of this attack.

4. Additional Experiments
4.1 Extreme TCP / UDP Unlimited Timers Test Methodology
Since none of the tests (TCP, UDP, or ICMP) were able to fill up the translation table when the
default timers were set, another set of tests was designed to run with the timers set to a extremely
high number. This way, the effects of a full translation table on the Extreme platform could be
observed. This test did not need to be executed on the other platforms because the effects of a
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full translation table could be seen using the default timers (Cisco, Linksys, VMWare TCP).
Unfortunately this test could not be performed on the Vyatta device because the timers were not
configurable.
#!/bin/bash
For ((i=0; i<300; i++))
Do
Sudo nmap -sU 74.74.74.3-254 1>/dev/null 2/dev/null &
Done

#!/bin/bash
For ((i=0; i<300; i++))
Do
Sudo nmap -sS 74.74.74.3-254 1>/dev/null 2/dev/null &
Done

The same scripts that were used in the previous rounds of testing would still be used in order to
see if there were any differences in the effects of a TCP vs a UDP attack on the device.
The topology for each test was set up as shown in previous experiments with three PCs
connected to a switch behind a NAT device which then connected to an external host on the
external network. The external host was hosting an FTP server and a TFTP server which had
access one large movie file to transfer. Only the Extreme device would be tested in these
experiments. The Extreme device ran through the test 5 times to ensure the validity of the data.
Before the attack began, all of the hosts issued pings to each other to verify connectivity. This
also allowed for verification that the NAT translations were occurring correctly between the
inside network and the external network. After initial connectivity and translation functionality
were established, an internal host tested TCP and UDP functionality by using FTP and TFTP
between the inside and outside. After full functionality was determined, a unidirectional JPerf
test was run between an inside host and the outside host. This ensured that the NAT device
could not be brought down by a full load of traffic from a single device. After all of the testing
had finished, commands would be issued to the NAT device to clear the translation table and
reset the NAT statistics when applicable.
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After the verification process, the attacker would kick off the script and a timer (on a stopwatch)
would be started. Each attack period would last for 5 minutes and then the NMAP processes
would be killed. Every minute during the attack, internal hosts would attempt to ping the
internal gateway, the external gateway, and the outside host. Additionally, every minute, the
internal hosts would attempt to establish an FTP and a TFTP session and attempt to transfer a
file. Also, every minute the relevant commands would be issued to the NAT device (when
applicable) to determine the number of translations and to verify that the correct translations
were being put into the translation table.
After the attack had completed, internal hosts would then attempt to ping each other, the internal
gateway, the external gateway, and the external host. Additionally, internal hosts would then
attempt to establish FTP and TFTP sessions with the external hosts in order to transfer the movie
file. This process would be repeated until all attempts were successful or until 15 minutes
elapsed.
4.2 Extreme Unlimited Timers Experimental Results
4.2.1 Extreme Unlimited Timers TCP Results
For this test, the TCP timeout, syn timeout, and fin/rst timeout were set to 655555555 minutes to
allow ample time to fill the translation table with entries. During the attack, hosts lose
connectivity to the outside like in previous attacks and the CPU usage goes almost to 100
percent. Since none of the entries would expire, after two minutes and 30 seconds (on average)
the Extreme device would stop adding new entries into the table. The maximum number
achievable was 64,512 entries every time as can be seen in Figure 28.

Figure 28: Maximum TCP entries for one outside address
Since there didn't appear to be any memory failures or other warnings from the Extreme device,
this appears to be a predetermined maximum set by Extreme. This number is significantly lower
than the maximum possible in the Cisco device. When the table was full, no new TCP
connections could be established and UDP transfers using TFTP failed as well. After the table
became full, no new packets could be seen on the outside network, meaning that the device not
only did not make new translations, it dropped the packets that could not be translated as well.
After the table was cleared, all devices operated normally.
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4.2.2 Extreme Unlimited Timers UDP Results
For this test, the UDP timeout was set to 655555555 to allow ample time to fill the translation
table with entries. During the attack there was a loss of connectivity between the inside and the
outside hosts much like the other attacks. After 2 minutes and 30 seconds (on average) the
translation table would fail to translate any new entries. The maximum number of entries in the
table at this time was 64,512 which is exactly the same number as the TCP attack with large
timers. Unlike the Cisco device, there were no memory failures and the router did not seem to be
affected in any other way when the translation table was filled. After the attack stopped (and the
table remained full), no new TCP or UDP sessions could be established between the inside and
outside. The outside hosts did not even see any packets from the inside network once the table
was filled. This means that the Extreme device not only does not translate new entries, it also
drops the packets that cannot be translated. This is an extremely important, because it means that
if the translation table can be filled by an attacker, all communication between the inside and
outside will cease. The fact that the number of translations stops at exactly 64,512 for UDP and
TCP points to the fact that this is a predefined number by the vendor and not a memory
limitation unlike the Cisco device.

Figure 29: Table full at 64,512 UDP entries

Figure 30: Portion of the UDP translation table
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4.3 Methodology for Navigating the Translation Table to the Inside
Once a connection is set up in the translation table, any packets matching the specific entry in the
table can pass back through to the inside. Generally this isn't a problem because the an attacker
on the outside would have to somehow guess the outside destination address, port, source port
and outside source address to gain entry. However if a node on the inside were to establish a
connection to the attacker, the attacker could gather enough information to craft malicious
packets and push them back through.
In order to simulate these circumstances the following topology was created:
192.168.1.1

Internal Host
Windows XP SP3
192.168.1.3
255.255.255.0
Running Transmission

74.74.74.1

Cisco
2651
Running
NAT

Malicious Host
Windows XP SP3
74.74.74.2
255.255.255.0
Running UTorrent

The external host created a private torrent which pointed to itself instead of a tracker and in the
real world would have had to distribute it through the web. The configuration to do this is
present in Figure 31. The private torrent was chosen to eliminate extraneous variables
introduced by the tracker, however a torrent using a tracker could be used to achieve the same
results.
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Figure 31: Private torrent configuration
The victim computer then ran the torrent file and established a session to the malicious host to
start downloading the file. The upload speed from the malicious attacker was limited to 50Kbps
in order to prolong the transfer and maintain the download session. The malicious attacker used
wireshark to examine the packets and determine the ports / addresses to forge and then used
Colasoft Packet Builder to craft various packets to send back through.
Additionally, since this is a private torrent a port had to be opened in the NAT device to allow
the internal host to get out, however this would not be needed if a tracker was being used.
However, this experiment assumes that the attacker has no knowledge of the forwarded port and
must gain the information through packet analysis.

4.4 Results for Navigating the Translation Table to the Inside
After the internal host ran the torrent file, the attacker (running wireshark) could gather a large
amount of information from the packet captures. Figure 32 shows the setup of the bittorrent
connection between the inside and outside host.
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Figure 32: Bittorrent Setup
The connection starts out with a normal three way handshake, however the push packets that are
sent before the connection ends give the attacker another helpful hint of information before the
TCP connection is torn down.
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Figure 33: The first push packet
Figure 33 shows the data that is inside the first push packet, which is sent from the internal host.
This contains the UDP port information (unfortunately not human readable) for the outside host
to connect to and the software and version that the user is using to connect. The second push
packet is from the external host confirming the ports and stating it's version.
After the initial TCP exchange, TCP and UDP packets are used for data transfer and since parts
of the transfer do not have sequence numbers (UDP), it is much easier to craft packets for this
stream using packet building software. In this experiment, Colasoft Packet Builder was used to
edit UDP packets and Colasoft Packet Player was used to send the packets into the network,
however any software such as hping or scappy could be used to customize packets to send back
through the network.
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Figure 34: Colasoft Packet Builder
In order to make sure that the packet was received on the inside of the network, the payload was
made into an easily recognizable patter as shown in Figure 35.

Figure 35: Easily recognizable UDP payload pattern
While the bittorrent transfer was running, the attacking computer sent several of these type
packets through the open connection in the NAT translation table and they were received by the
internal host as can be seen in Figure 36.
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Figure 36: Crafted Packet (Internal Network)
These results show that an attacker can use connection data to successfully map a connection
between the inside and outside of the NAT network and send crafted packets through.
Additionally, since bittorrent clients send out the software type and version when initiating the
session, this leaves open the possibility of attackers using these connections to exploit vulnerable
torrenting clients after a connection has been established.

5. Experiment Summary

Cisco 2651

Extreme Summit
200

TCP Attack
-Entries expired
quickly

UDP Attack
-Entries took time
to expire

ICMP Attack
-Entries expired
quickly

-High CPU during
attack

-Translation table
filled

-High CPU during
attack

-Connectivity Loss
during attack

-High CPU during
attack

-Connectivity
restored after
attack

-Connectivity lost
during attack

-No loss of
connectivity
during or after the
attack

Unlimited Timers
N/A

-Entries expired
quickly

-Connectivity lost
after attack, until
entries expired
-Entries expired
quickly

-Entries expired
quickly

-Translation table
filled

-High CPU during
attack

-High CPU during
attack

-High CPU during
attack

-High CPU during
attack

-Connectivity Loss
during attack

-Connectivity Loss
during attack

-No loss of
connectivity

-Connectivity lost
during attack
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Linksys

VMWare

-Connectivity
restored after
attack

-Connectivity
restored after
attack

during or after the
attack

-Immediate loss of
connectivity
during the attack

-Immediate loss of
connectivity
during the attack

-Immediate loss of
connectivity
during the attack

-Connectivity
restored after the
attack
-Entries took time
to expire

-Connectivity
restored after the
attack
-Entries expired
quickly

-Translation table
filled

-Slight latency
increase

-Connectivity lost
during attack

-No loss of
connectivity
during or after the
attack

-ICMP
connectivity
regained after
attack

Vyatta

-TCP / UDP
connectivity never
restored
-No loss of
connectivity
during or after the
attack

-No loss of
connectivity
during or after the
attack

-Connectivity lost
after attack, table
entries never
expired
N/A

-No loss of
connectivity
during or after the
attack

N/A

-No loss of
connectivity
during or after the
attack

N/A

The results of this experiment show that a small number of compromised nodes with the right
software can severely impact enterprise grade equipment in a short period of time. While almost
all platforms tested were negatively impacted by the TCP and UDP attacks, the effectiveness of
certain protocols for filling the translation tables varied from vendor to vendor. Additionally,
filling the translation tables also had varied effects on the devices performing the NAT
translations depending on what vendor created the device.
On the Cisco device, the translations filled the available memory on the device which not only
prevented new entries from being entered into the table (and therefore being translated) it also
caused memory allocation errors which negatively impacted other processes that the router was
performing. The Cisco device fared better against the TCP attacks due to its session tracking
capability and the aggressive timeouts on the SYN packets. The UDP attack on the other hand
was able to fill the table on this device and deny translation capabilities to all other devices on
the network.

Winemiller 41
The Extreme device on the other hand, limited the number of NAT translations allowed on one
address instead of letting it consume all of the other memory. This allowed for smaller number
of total entries, but preserved the integrity of the device when the table was filled. The Extreme
device fared very well against both TCP and UDP attacks due to its very aggressive default
timers. However, these timers are a double edged sword and by defying best practices and
standards laid down in the RFCs, could cause problems on a network with higher latency times.
For example, in the case of the Extreme device, the two minute default TCP timer could cause
certain TCP applications to fail because it expires so quickly. TCP logical connections can last
for a very long time even if connectivity is temporarily disrupted or there isn't any traffic to send
for a period of time. By expiring these TCP entries, the internal host will have to establish a new
session to the outside and most likely start the conversation over.
The Linksys device by far fared the worst of all the devices that were tested. It was unable to
handle the processing load of translating such a large amount of requests and therefore became
completely unreachable during the attack. TCP and UDP attacks were equally effective against
this device. Unfortunately, the lack of accessibility during the attack (in-band management only)
and limited logging made any more insight into the operation of this device all but impossible.
While the VMWare device fared well against the UDP attack (unlike the Cisco device) it was
severely impacted by the TCP attack. Service was denied during the attack and unlike the rest of
the devices tested, TCP and UDP connections could no longer be established even after the
attack had ended. The only way to restore full connectivity was to restart the VMWare NAT
service. This would pose a significant problem to network administrators since outside
connectivity would appear to be restored (ICMP echo requests would work), but any service
related applications would cease to function. Unfortunately, the VMWare NAT process has
limited configuration and debug capabilities so determining the exact cause of this disruption is
also next to impossible.
The Vyatta device fared extremely well during these tests. These attacks didn't appear to have
any impact despite having several thousand translations entered into the table. Due to the
resources at my disposal, the only device to test this platform was markedly more powerful than
the other devices tested in this series of experiments. Interestingly enough, Vyatta also defies
RFC recommendations by not allowing for the administrator to adjust any of the timers that are
used in the translation process. Additionally, while I was unable to do so in my experiments, the
default TCP timer is extremely long and the Vyatta device doesn't appear to do any session
tracking (unlike the Extreme or Cisco devices). This could possibly be exploited on a device that
is less powerful or being actively utilized on an enterprise network.
Despite the differences in implementation, all of the devices except for the Vyatta device
experienced extremely high CPU utilization as a result of the NAT translations. This actually
proved as effective if not more effective at denying service to internal users than filling up the
translation tables did. The high CPU utilization ended up causing the network outage long
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before the tables were filled up on these devices. While larger and more robust devices would be
able to handle a higher load, these larger devices are generally under a heavy load in an
enterprise setting. Therefore, creating a large number of translations is an effective strategy to
deny service in even very large network settings.
In addition to the denial of service attacks, an attacker can also craft packets that can navigate
through the NAT Translation table. This becomes much more likely in scenarios where inside
hosts are establishing active connections to the attacking node (in this case during a torrent).
Despite the fact that it requires relatively little effort to do, this type of attack is overly complex
and begs the question of why an attacker would use such a method when they could just disguise
a malware file as the file the user is downloading from them.
It is interesting to note however, that unlike when the CAM (Content Addressable Memory)
table, which holds the MAC address / port entries, becomes full on a switch, the NAT device
does not "fail open" and pass all traffic. When the translation table became full (in all cases
where this was possible), no new translations could occur and the NAT devices would drop any
new traffic not already in the table. Another point to note is that the NAT devices did not FIFO
any translation entries. While expired entries were FIFO'd out, if the table became full, the
entries remained in the table until they expired. Therefore, new entries could not be added until
the old entries expired (which could be a significant amount of time).
Another interesting conclusion that can be drawn from these experiments is that the differing
implementations of NAT between the vendors (especially in the case of timers) could cause
interoperability issues if a connection has to traverse a NAT device on the source end and the
destination end. While TCP connections are generally given a duly long amount of time before
expiration, UDP connection timeouts varied greatly between the vendors. With VMWare and
Vyatta allowing only 30 seconds before the UDP entry times out, significant application issues
could occur over high latency networks that span long distances.
The relatively small number of compromised nodes required to execute the attack paired with the
fact that NAT generally causes a single point of failure for a large number of users makes this a
relatively easy and effective type of denial of service attack to execute. Furthermore, while it
may be difficult to fill up a translation table on a device with a significant amount of memory,
the effects of the attack on the processing capabilities of the NAT devices makes this attack
scalable to almost any network size. Therefore, we can conclude that this attack is viable in an
enterprise setting and against several mainstream vendor devices that are currently deployed.

6. Mitigation Techniques
The main ways that the NAT denial of service attack takes advantage of the NAT device is to
either fill up the translation table to prevent new entries or to create so many entries that the
processor on the device cannot keep up. Therefore the most obvious way to mitigate the effects
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of this attack is to limit the number of translations that hosts are allowed to make. Making a rule
that limits the number of overall translations allowed is common, and while this may solve the
issue of high CPU utilization, this technique makes it easier for the attacker to fill the table and
deny service to legitimate users service. Because of this, limiting the number of translations
must be applicable to individual hosts.
Cisco has features in place in their IOS to accomplish this goal relatively well. Most platforms
support rate limiting of some kind, but the Cisco platform supports rate limiting by either the
total number of translations, the number of translations that can be created by a list (that includes
a number of hosts), and the number of translations a specific host can make [6]. Obviously
limiting the total number of translations would prove counter-productive, and while limiting the
number of translations a specified host can use is fine on a smaller network, this mitigation
technique cannot scale to a large network. Therefore grouping networks into lists would be the
best option to limit the amount of users that can be denied service by a single node. However
even this method would become incredibly cumbersome on a large network with many subnets.
Additionally, having to keep track of the number of connections each list currently has requires
processing time and could adversely impact the performance of the device.
The Extreme device on the other hand supports what the vendor calls "Auto-constraining," which
limits the amount of ports a single internal host can use at one time [7]. This works by evenly
distributing the amount of port space between each internal user evenly [7]. While this is easy to
configure and can be effective in smaller networks, this feature could end up preventing
legitimate users from making new connections in a scenario where there are a large number of
internal users and a very small number of external addresses to map to.
The ideal type of configuration strategy to safeguard against this type of attack would be a
command that could limit the number of translations allowed per user (that doesn't have to be
specifically defined) to a specified amount. This way the administrator can determine what
constitutes a reasonable number of translations per host and put the policy into place quickly and
easily. However this technique would still require processing power on the part of the NAT
device, and could degrade network performance. Additionally, this technique would not prevent
an attacker from spoofing different source addresses, but it would make it significantly more
difficult to execute the attack.
Unfortunately, the Linksys, VMWare, and Vyatta platforms don't appear to support any of these
types of features at all which makes stopping this type of attack much more difficult when using
these platforms.
Another feature that is built into most NAT platforms is the ability to control the amount of time
that passes before an entry in the table expires. This is best evidenced by the table on the
Extreme device that couldn't be filled in this experiment using the normal timers. Unfortunately
the Vyatta and Linksys platforms do not allow the administrator to configure these timers, which

Winemiller 44
makes them less able to prevent the NAT DOS attack. However, administrators need to be
careful when setting these timers since they could time out legitimate sessions prematurely and
cause applications to malfunction, especially in higher latency networks with a high traffic
volume. Despite being able to prevent the table from filling up, the Extreme device was taken
down due to the high CPU utilization of the NAT attack. Therefore, the best solution to
preventing this type of attack is to use a combination of rate limiting and carefully adjusted
timers. This way legitimate users can still make connections, stale connections can age out in a
timely fashion, and the number of connections that can be made by a single host can be limited
to a reasonable amount.
Another important device that could help limit or at least minimize the effects of this attack is an
IDS device. These kinds of devices analyze the network to establish a baseline and can detect
when traffic patterns deviate significantly from the norm. This device could alert an
administrator when a compromised node is executing this attack and the administrator could then
take action to remediate the problem. However, these devices need to be calibrated so that they
do not confuse normal behavior of legitimate hosts with that of an attacker, otherwise the false
positives could cause a delay when trying to pinpoint the source of an attack. These mitigation
techniques work well in theory, however experiments to gauge the effectiveness of these
techniques were not tested in this study.

7. Final Conclusions
While NAT with Port Translation is widely deployed and is in fact, necessary for internet
connectivity in the modern age, many of the drawbacks of using NAT with Port Translation are
often overlooked. These experiments show that as a consequence of this fact, equipment used to
create NAT are vulnerable to attacks that can severely impact network connectivity to a large
number of users. The NAT translation table creates a single point of failure that will block out
all legitimate traffic if it is filled. While the consequences of filling the table differ in severity
depending on the vendor, each case where this was accomplished negatively impacted the
network in a substantial way.
While there are several RFCs that establish NAT and attempt to standardize NAT behavior, these
experiments show that NAT implementations can vary significantly between Vendors. A detail
that is left unclear in the RFCs is what the maximum translation table size should be. This
experiment showed that this detail also varies from vendor to vendor. The translation table on
the Cisco device is limited only by the amount of memory that can be filled with translation data
while the maximum number of translations on the Extreme device is limited by the manufacturer
to a specific number of translations per outside IP address. The Vyatta device appeared to act
like the Cisco device, however I was unable to fill the translation table to verify this. The
experimental tests on the Linksys and VMWare were inconclusive as to the maximum size of
their translation tables due to the lack of output available from each of these solutions.
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Some of the other features that tended to vary were the default timers for various types of traffic,
the configurability of these timers, and TCP session tracking. These experiments show that the
inclusion of TCP session tracking in order to expire unfinished TCP connections not only
effectively mitigates the TCP DOS attack that was demonstrated, but also helps to keep the table
size to a minimum during normal operation. However, despite the fact that both Cisco and
Extreme include this feature, their default timers end sessions extremely fast when compared to
the recommendations in RFC 2663. While this does age out stale entries rapidly, this could
result in application issues due to the graceless nature in which connections would be closed.
Additionally, this experiment also showed that the ability to adjust timers is critical in
controlling NAT translation table size. RFC 2663 notes recommends that vendors include this
feature for this very reason. While adjusting timers to suit the network needs is an integral part
of NAT operation, network administrators must be extremely careful when doing so to avoid
terminating legitimate sessions prematurely. Even though the lack of the feature could be
expected with a personal use device like the Linksys router which was tested, it was surprising to
find that VMWare workstation lacked the capability to adjust timers for TCP sessions and that
Vyatta lacks any options to configure NAT timers.
A few traits were fairly consistent on almost all of the platforms. This experiment showed that
the process of creating, maintaining, and expiring NAT translations is extremely CPU intensive.
All platforms except the Vyatta device were severely affected during the attack. Despite the fact
that the translation tables were not full on the Cisco and Extreme devices, all network
connectivity between the inside and outside was lost when the attack was ongoing. Additionally
the Linksys device suffered immediate network failure during the attack because of this fact.
The VMWare device was also impacted during the attack but less so than the other platforms.
The Vyatta device is the only outlier and this can be attributed to the overwhelmingly powerful
hardware that was used when compared to the other devices.
An additional fact that was discovered during the process of this experiment was the fact that
unlike when the CAM becomes full on a switch, the router does not "fail open" like switches do.
When the translation table becomes full on a NAT device, the device will not translate any traffic
that is not already in the table until an entry ages out and a new entry can be added in.
Furthermore, the router will also drop any new traffic if new translations cannot be made. It
does not send out the traffic un-translated as is the case when traffic does not match the
translation rule.
This experiment also showed that an attacker could utilize knowledge of current NAT
translations to send packets back to the inside network. Torrent programs in particular establish
many connections to many different hosts, thereby opening many avenues for external hosts to
get to the inside network. However, this attack requires that an inside host make some sort of
connection or transfer with the attacker, which makes executing this attack somewhat convoluted
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considering the attacker could just have the inside host download a malware file instead.
Therefore this attack isn't very likely to occur in a real world scenario.
From these experiments it can be concluded that network administrators need to become familiar
with the equipment they are deploying in their networks when using NAT with Port Translation.
Since each vendor has their own way of doing things, and different capabilities, administrators
must configure their devices based on need in order to ensure optimum efficiency and to help
mitigate possible threats from attackers targeting the NAT. In order to further protect the
network, administrators should also employ IDPS devices as an early warning and to help isolate
malicious users before they can cause a large network outage.

8. Future Work
Since these experiments were limited to the devices available in the RIT labs with a limited
amount of hosts, future work could involve performing these experiments in an environment
with more active traffic to determine if it becomes easier or more difficult to interrupt legitimate
traffic. Additionally, future work could be done to determine if other mainstream platforms such
as Juniper Networks are able to be compromised in the same manner as these experiments.
Furthermore, while this experiment proved that knowledge of the NAT translation table could be
used to navigate to the inside, more research could be done in order to determine if certain
applications are more vulnerable to being compromised using this method than others. IDS and
IDPS devices could also be used in order to determine their effectiveness at detecting and
mitigating the attacks that were demonstrated in this experiment.
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10. Appendix
10.1 Cisco Basic NAT Configuration
interface FastEthernet0/0
ip address 74.74.74.1 255.255.255.0
ip nat outside
duplex auto
speed auto
!
interface Serial0/0
no ip address
shutdown
!
interface FastEthernet0/1
ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0
ip nat inside
duplex auto
speed auto
!
ip nat inside source list translate interface FastEthernet0/0 overload
ip classless
ip http server
!
!
ip access-list standard translate
permit any

10.2 Extreme Basic NAT Configuration
# Configuration Mode
create vlan "n_inside"
create vlan "n_outside"
# Config information for VLAN n_inside.
configure vlan "n_inside" ipaddress 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0
configure vlan "n_inside" add port 1 untagged
configure vlan "n_inside" add port 2 untagged
#
# Config information for VLAN n_outside.
configure vlan "n_outside" ipaddress 74.74.74.1 255.255.255.0
configure vlan "n_outside" add port 24 untagged

# NAT configuration
configure nat add "n_outside" map source any to 74.74.74.1/32 both portmap
configure nat add "n_outside" map source any to 74.74.74.1/32
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configure nat n_outside outside
configure nat "n_inside" inside
enable nat

10.3 Cisco NAT Timer Commands
ip nat translation udp-timeout 655555555
ip nat translation tcp-timeout 655555555
ip nat translation icmp-timeout 65555555
ip nat translation syn-timeout 655555555
ip nat translation finrst-timeout 65555555

10.4 Extreme NAT Timer Commands
configure nat timeout 655555555
configure nat tcp-timeout 655555555
configure nat udp-timeout 655555555
configure nat icmp-timeout 655555555
configure nat finrst-timeout 655555555
configure nat syn-timeout 655555555

10.5 VMNetnat.conf
# Windows NAT configuration file
[host]
# NAT gateway address
ip = 192.168.40.2/24
hostMAC = 00:50:56:C0:00:08
# enable configuration; disabled by default for security reasons
#configport = 33445
# VMnet device if not specified on command line
device = vmnet8
# Allow PORT/EPRT FTP commands (they need incoming TCP stream...)
activeFTP = 1
# Allows the source to have any OUI. Turn this one if you change the OUI
# in the MAC address of your virtual machines.
allowAnyOUI = 1
[udp]
# Timeout in seconds, 0 = no timeout, default = 30; real value might
# be up to 100% longer
timeout = 30
[dns]
# This section applies only to Windows.
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#
# Policy to use for DNS forwarding. Accepted values include order,
# rotate, burst.
#
# order: send one DNS request at a time in order of the name servers
# rotate: send one DNS request at a time, rotate through the DNS servers
# burst: send to three servers and wait for the first one to respond
policy = order
# Timeout in seconds before retrying DNS request.
timeout = 2
# Retries before giving up on DNS request
retries = 3
# Automatically detect the DNS servers (not supported in Windows NT)
autodetect = 1
# List of DNS servers to use. Up to three may be specified
#nameserver1 = 198.41.0.4
#nameserver2 = 192.36.148.17
#nameserver3 = 202.12.27.33
[netbios]
# This section applies only to Windows.
# Timeout for NBNS queries.
nbnsTimeout = 2
# Number of retries for each NBNS query.
nbnsRetries = 3
# Timeout for NBDS queries.
nbdsTimeout = 3
[incomingtcp]
# Use these with care - anyone can enter into your virtual machine through these...
# FTP (both active and passive FTP is always enabled)
#
ftp localhost 8887
#8887 = 192.168.27.128:21
# WEB (make sure that if you are using named webhosting, names point to
# your host, not to guest... And if you are forwarding port other
# than 80 make sure that your server copes with mismatched port
# number in Host: header)
#
lynx http://localhost:8888
#8888 = 192.168.27.128:80
# SSH
#
ssh -p 8889 root@localhost
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#8889 = 192.168.27.128:22
[incomingudp]
# UDP port forwarding example
#6000 = 192.168.27.128:6001
[PrivilegedTCP]
autodetect = 1
[PrivilegedUDP]
autodetect = 1

10.6 Vyatta Basic NAT configuration
Service {
NAT {
Rule 1 {
Outbound-interface eth1
Source {
192.168.1.0/24
}
Type masquerade
}
}
}

